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Abstract  
In this article, we consider the impact of fiscal decentralization on government quality by way of 
disaggregated measures of the former. Specifically, we break down fiscal decentralization into 
sub-central expenditure on public procurement and compensation of public sector employees. 
We find that decentralizing public procurement is bad for government performance while the 
decentralization of public sector wages improves governance. We relate the negative effect to 
the rent-seeking activity of interest groups and the positive effect to the informational 
advantage of sub-central provision. Moreover, we explore the impact of the Great Recession on 
our results and find that it is associated with stronger negative and positive effects of 
decentralization on governance, something which is consistent with the observed increased in 
the degree of decentralization since 2007.  
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Over the last several decades there has been a global trend towards the fiscal decentralization 
of the state with the aim of attaining a range of economic, social and political outcomes (see 
Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2017 for a comprehensive recent survey). One such objective is 
government efficiency or quality that includes the relative absence of corruption, the prevalence 
of rule of law and the efficient provision of public goods and services (La Porta et al., 1999; 
Kyriacou, 2014). In this vein, it has been suggested that fiscal decentralization, or the assignment 
of tax and spending autonomy to sub-central governments, has the potential to improve 
governance in the public sector. The basic idea is that at sub-central levels both government and 
citizens are better informed something which should improve the provision of public services. 
Moreover, decentralization can introduce an element of competition among sub-central 
governments, competition for tax base, to the benefit of efficiency. But proximity also has its 
dangers since it may increase the capacity of special interests to capture public officials. And 
competition can lead to a (tax) race to the bottom thus hollowing out state capacity.  
The empirical evidence to date is strongly supportive of the expectation that fiscal 
decentralization can benefit government quality. Fiscal decentralization has been associated 
with lower corruption and better governance more generally defined. But this evidence is based 
on indicators of fiscal decentralization measuring total sub-national government spending or 
revenue as a percentage of total general government spending or revenue. To date, no study 
has considered how, and the extent to which, different components of public spending or 
revenue can impact on governance. That this may be the case on the revenue side, is suggested 
by the fiscal federalism literature that relates the degree of inter-jurisdictional competition to 
the mobility of the tax base. Competition and thus the disciplining effect on local governments 
are enhanced when taxes are levied on more mobile tax base through, for example, company 
or sales taxes.   
In this article, we will focus instead on the expenditure side by analyzing the extent to which the 
potential effects of decentralization on governance depend on the nature of public expenditure. 
We argue that sub-central government spending on public procurement undermines 
government quality because this type of spending is subject to government discretion and 
involves projects that concentrate a large volume of rents and, as such, is more vulnerable to 
interest group capture. Alternatively, sub-central spending on public sector wages is likely to 
improve governance because it does not combine concentrated rents and discretion and, 
moreover, because it reflects public service provision and thus may pick up the information 
advantages of decentralization. We provide empirical evidence supporting this intuition from a 
sample of 31 European countries over the period 1995 to 2015. Our results are robust to the use 
of several governance and decentralization indicators, a host of control variables as well as 
methods that address reverse causality concerns.  
Another contribution of this article is the consideration of the impact of fiscal decentralization 
on governance – based on disaggregated measures of the former – before and after 2007. That 
is, we explore the extent to which the Great Recession has affected the relationship between 
our key variables. We observe that the degree of fiscal decentralization of public procurement 
spending and public employee compensation has generally increased after 2007 something that, 
according to our reasoning, should both worsen the problems of capture and enhance the 
benefits expected from informational advantages. And indeed, our empirical evidence supports 
this expectation because we find that the negative impact on governance of decentralization of 
public procurement is larger and more robust during the period 2008-2015.  Similarly, after 2007 
the positive impact of sub-central expenditure of public employee compensation increases.  




The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we review theoretical and empirical work 
that has discussed how fiscal decentralization impacts on government quality and make the case 
for analyzing the components of decentralization. Having done so, we then discuss the key 
indicators employed in the paper to conduct the empirical analysis – focusing also on how these 
have evolved after 2007. We then present the empirical methodology adopted in the article as 
well as our empirical findings before concluding.  
 
Theory and existing evidence  
The theoretical arguments concerning the impact of fiscal decentralization on government 
quality are ambiguous. Thus, it has been argued that fiscal decentralization will improve 
government performance: because it empowers sub-central governments who are expected to 
be better informed about citizen needs (Oates, 1972); because it empowers citizens who may 
be better informed about local compared to central government performance (Seabright, 1992), 
perhaps because they can use the performance of other sub-central governments as a 
benchmark (Salmon 1987, Breton, 1996), and; because it launches a process of inter-
jurisdictional competition for fiscal resources that disciplines local governments and drives them 
towards efficiency (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). But fiscal decentralization can also 
potentially undermine government quality: proximity to citizens can lead to government capture 
by special interests since relations tend to be more intimate and personal in nature and because 
local government being less prestigious and powerful than central government may be less 
intensely monitored (Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1995; Bardhan, 2002); fiscal competition 
undermines the fiscal capacity of local governments (Keen and Marchand, 1997; Oates, 1999); 
the creation of additional government levels makes it more difficult for citizens to discern who 
is responsible for good or bad policy (Tavits, 2007) and can lead to fiscal or regulatory 
`overgrazing' (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).  
The empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports the expectation that fiscal decentralization will 
enhance government performance. A range of scholars have found that fiscally decentralized 
countries tend to be less corrupt (for example, Fisman and Gatti, 2002 and Fan, et al., 2009) 
while others have found that fiscal decentralization has a positive effect on a range of 
governance indicators besides control of corruption (De Mello and Barenstein, 2001;  Enikolopov 
and Zhuravskaya, 2007, Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés, 2011a, 2011b; Kyriacou, et al., 2017). When 
calibrating the relationship between fiscal decentralization and governance, scholars have 
employed aggregate measures of fiscal decentralization either on the expenditure or revenue 
sides, at times taking into account inter-governmental transfers in an effort to capture sub-
central governments’ fiscal autonomy.  
To the best of our knowledge, no study has yet to explore the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and governance by way of disaggregated measures of the former. But it could 
be that different expenditure items and revenue sources may behave differently. For example, 
decentralizing taxes on more mobile agents such as firms is likely to intensify inter-jurisdictional 
competition significantly more than taxes on less mobile actors such as wage earners or property 
owners. Or differences in excise taxes across regions may lead consumers to shop across 
jurisdictional boundaries thus enhancing inter-jurisdictional competition. The optimal taxation 
or revenue structure across different government levels refers, of course, to the “tax assignment 
problem” which has been identified and extensively studied in the context of classic fiscal 
federalism (see, Oates 1999 for a review of related work).   
Rather than consider the revenue side, our focus here is to examine the possibility of differential 
effects emerging when decentralizing different components of public expenditure. Specifically, 
we break down fiscal decentralization into two different components: public procurement 
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spending and compensation of public sector employees. Public procurement refers to the 
acquisition of goods and services by the state. Specifically, general government procurement is 
defined as the sum of intermediate consumption, gross fixed capital formation and social 
transfers in kind via market producers. Compensation of public employees refers to the wage of 
government employees plus non-wage costs such as social contributions. Our measures of the 
degree of decentralization of public procurement and compensation of employees reflect public 
spending by sub-central governments as a percentage of total spending in these areas.  
We expect public procurement spending to be the most vulnerable to misallocation. 
Misallocation would emerge when public procurement contracts are assigned to a closed 
network of insiders and denied to all others (Fazekas and Ferrando 2015). It may mean that the 
officials entrusted with the purchase choose the best briber rather than the supplier offering 
the best price-quality combination, something that will tend to inflate the cost of the purchase 
for the public purse at the same time as it undermines quality (Soreide 2002). One reason for 
the relative vulnerability of public procurement to misallocation is that this type of expenditure, 
which includes capital spending, is highly discretional (see, also, Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). 
Another reason is that public procurement spending includes spending on large public projects 
whose cost may be difficult to ascertain thus making it vulnerable to rent-seeking activities 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Mauro 1998)1.  
Based on this, one would expect the problem of capture by local actors alluded to by those 
warning of the dangers of fiscal decentralization, to be greater when decentralizing fiscal 
resources whose expenditure is discretionary and can involve large projects that provide 
opportunities for rent creation. Such is the nature of public procurement and we would 
therefore expect that, ceteris paribus, the decentralization of public procurement to have a 
negative impact on government quality. Alternatively, spending on public employee 
compensation is less vulnerable to capture because it is neither discretionary nor does it present 
an important and concentrated source of rents. Moreover, public sector wages are, by 
definition, paid to public employees working in administration, education, health and other 
sectors. As such, compensation of public employees is inherently linked to the provision of public 
services. Recall that one of the potential benefits of fiscal decentralization is that it empowers 
local governments and citizens who are better informed, thus allowing for more efficient 
provision. From this perspective, one would expect decentralized compensation of employees, 




Good governance is impartial governance in that public officials implement laws and policies 
regardless of personal preferences and relationships (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). This means 
that public resources are allocated according to impersonal criteria motivated by efficiency 
concerns rather than in response to the private interest of public officials and economic interest 
groups. It requires the rule of law or the application of law equally to all regardless of their 
position. It implies that the public administration is recruited meritocratically, that it is 
independent from political pressures, and that it provides public services efficiently.  
Accordingly, we measure government quality by way of the World Bank Government Indicators 
that capture perceptions of experts across a range of governance dimensions (Kaufmann et al., 
                                                          
1 This same rationale – large projects combined with government discretion – has been used to explain 
the strong link between corruption and the importance of the natural resource (Ades and Di Tella 1999; 
Busse and Gröning 2013) and construction (private and public) sectors (Kyriacou et al. 2015).  




2010). Specifically, we focus on four dimensions: control of corruption capturing perceptions of 
the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain; rule of law or the extent to which 
agents have confidence in, and abide by, the rules of society; regulatory quality or perceptions 
of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations and; 
government effectiveness capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of 
the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures. These government 
dimensions are likely to be inherently related since they capture the notion of good governance 
as impartial application of laws, regulations and policies. This may be one reason for the very 
high statistical correlations among these four dimensions (Langbein and Knack, 2010).  Because 
of this, we take the mean value that results when combining these four dimensions to generate 
an aggregate measure of good governance that ranges from -1 to 1 with higher values reflecting 
better governance. In our sample, high values correspond to the Nordic countries and also the 
Netherlands and Germany, while the majority of the transition economies (especially Bulgaria, 
Romania and Croatia) and also Greece and Italy are assigned lower values (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Government Quality (mean period 1995-2015) 
 
Source: World Governance Indicators. 
 
To measure fiscal decentralization, we turn to Eurostat which reports both aggregate and 
disaggregate indicators. Fiscal decentralization in aggregate is sub-national expenditure as a 
percentage of general government expenditure. We break down this aggregate measure into 
three sub-components; public procurement spending, compensation of public employees and a 
residual catch-all category for the remainder of sub-national spending. Public procurement 
refers to the purchase of goods and services consumed by the government during its production 
process (intermediate consumption), acquisitions, less disposals, of fixed assets during a given 
period plus certain additions to the value of non-produced assets realized by the productive 
activity of producer or institutional units (gross fixed capital formation) and individual goods and 
services provided as transfers in kind to individual households by government units and 
purchased  on  the  market (social transfers in kind via market producers). Compensation of 





















































































6 International Center for Public Policy 
 
social contributions. The residual category includes a range of items such as social benefits other 
than social transfers in kind, subsidies and capital transfers payable. When combined with our 
chosen measure of governance, this data yields an unbalanced panel sample of 31 European 
countries, the 28 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, over the period 1995 
to 2015. It is notable that in this sample, decentralization refers exclusive to local government 
in 26 out of 31 countries. The exceptions are Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany and Spain 
where decentralization also includes the regional level.   
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To present an overview of the importance of fiscal decentralization by country, in figure 2 we 
show the share of subnational expenditure by components in means for the whole period (1995- 
2015). We observe high levels of decentralization in the compensation of employees component 
across countries: in Switzerland, Germany, Sweden and Belgium more than 75% of public 
salaries are paid by subnational authorities, and in other 6 countries this percentage is higher 
than 50%. Decentralization is also high in the case of public procurement: in 6 countries, led by 
Spain and Italy, the subnational authorities spend more than half of the resources dedicated to 
public procurement, and in 16 countries they spend more than a third. By contrast, the levels of 
decentralization in the case of the rest of expenditure are clearly lower since this is below 10% 
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in 17 countries and just 3 countries have levels above 30%. Figure 2 also shows that subnational 
expenditure, no matter the component, is extremely limited in Malta, Cyprus and Greece.  
To illustrate the relative volume of resources spent by subnational governments, Figure 3 
presents the amount of the three expenditure components in terms of share of GDP and in 
means for the whole period (1995-2015). Again, there are major differences across countries: in 
7 countries, the subnational authorities spend a volume of resources representing more than 
17% of their GDP (this group includes the 5 countries where regional expenditure 
decentralization is relevant as well as Denmark, Sweden and Finland), while on the other end in 
4 countries the subnational authorities spend less than 5% of their GDP (this is the case of Malta, 
Cyprus, Greece and Luxembourg). On the other hand, Figure 3 shows that the public 
procurement and compensation of employees components are generally more important than 
the rest of expenditure with the exception of Denmark and, to a lesser extent, Germany, 
Switzerland, Belgium and Austria.  
 






















































































Fiscal Decentralization 1995-2007 Fiscal Decentralization 2008-2015








In figure 4 we consider how aggregate fiscal decentralization evolves after 2007 or, in the 
context of the Great recession. We break down the mean values per country into two sub-
periods namely 1995-2007 and 2008-2015. The figure is suggestive of a trend towards greater 
fiscal decentralization after 2007 in most countries. This pattern is confirmed when we break 
down fiscal decentralization into the two components we analyze in this article as can be seen 
in figures A1 and A2 in the appendix (respectively showing decentralized public procurement 
and compensation of public employee spending). We pursue the evolution of fiscal 
decentralization after 2007 further in figure 5 where we show aggregate fiscal decentralization 
in terms of GDP in the period 1995-2007 and during 2008-2015. Again, a general trend emerges 
showing an increase in the relative volume of resources spent by sub-central governments after 
2007. And this pattern also emerges when considering sub-central spending on public 
procurement and compensation of employees in terms of GDP (see, respectively, figures A3 and 
A4 in the appendix). Taken together, figures 4 and 5 indicate that fiscal decentralization has 
increased since the Great Recession (for a similar finding, see also OECD/KIPF (2016) and De 
Mello and Jalles, 2018). Given our previous discussion in section 2, we would expect this to 
worsen the problem of capture by special interests in the case of public procurement. Moreover, 
by increasing the information available to sub-central government and citizens it should improve 
the efficient provision of public services, something that could be picked up by an increase in 
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Empirical methodology and results  
We estimate the following empirical model:  
 
Government Qualityit = 0 + 1 DPPit + 2DCEit + 3Xit +εit       (1) 
 
Where i and t refer to countries and years respectively, DPP is decentralization of public 
procurement spending, DCE is decentralization of compensation of public sector employees, X 
is a vector of control variables and ε an error term. We estimate the model with OLS based on 
panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) that are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation between the residuals of a given cross-section (Period SUR). We always include 
period fixed effects to account for the impact of time varying factors affecting all countries. 
Country fixed effects are not employed because of the limited within-country variation 
compared to the cross-section variance (for example, our base governance indicator has a mean 
value of 4.716 and a within standard deviation of 0.522 compared to a between deviation of 
2.548). We estimate the model using annual data and four-year averages, that latter, to control 
for the business cycle and focus on the structural relationship between the key variables of 
interest. 
Our choice of control variables is inspired by previous work and is ultimately guided by the need 
to reduce omitted variable bias. We control for the degree of decentralization of remaining 
public expenditure, beyond public procurement and compensation of employees, to account for 
the total degree of fiscal decentralization. We also control for GDP per capita since both good 
governance and decentralization may be expensive (Islam and Montenegro, 2002 Wheare, 
1964). We account for country size (here proxied by GDP) since it may be easier to govern small 
countries or, alternatively, there may be economies of scale in the provision of good governance 
(Knack and Azfar, 2003), and because large countries tend to be more decentralized (Panizza, 
1999). Moreover, we control for total expenditure (in terms of GDP) on public procurement, 
employee compensation and other spending undertaken by central and sub-central 
governments since the size of the public sector determines the availability of rents that can be 
dedicated towards good governance or, alternatively, that can be employed inefficiently or even 
appropriated through corruption (Tanzi, 1998; Montinola and Jackman 2002). We control for 
membership of the European Union since EU laws and policies may have an impact on 
governance and public expenditure. Further, we account for the degree of political autonomy 
enjoyed by local governments since political decentralization may also impact on the quality of 
governance (Enikolopov and Zhuruvskaya, 2007; Kyriacou and Roca 2011a,b) and because most 
of the sub-central expenditure in our sample is undertaken by local governments. We also 
include in our matrix of control variables the percentage of the population affiliated with 
Protestantism since previous work has argued that this religion may promote values – 
individualism, egalitarian social relations, education –  that make people more likely to challenge 
public officials (Treisman, 2000). Protestantism may also impact on the size and composition of 
public spending (La Porta et al., 1999) perhaps due to its emphasis on thrift and work. Finally, 
we control for the extent to which the country is ethnically fractionalized since heterogeneity 
may have a negative impact on governance because it makes agreement on government policy 
more difficult (Alesina et al. 1999) and because it can undermine social capital and facilitates 
secessionism (Alesina and Zhuruvskaya 2011; Kyriacou and Morral-Palacín, 2015). Ethnic 
heterogeneity may also impact on the degree of decentralization: either increasing it in response 
to demands by ethnic groups for more autonomy (Panizza, 1999; Alesina and Spolaore, 2003) or 




decreasing it insofar as central governments resist decentralization to avoid secessionism 




Table 1 reports a first group of empirical results. In columns 1 (with annual data) and 3 (with 
four year means) we regress our preferred governance indicator on the aggregate measure of 
fiscal decentralization and, in line with previous work, find a positive and statistically significant 
association. Things change however when we disaggregate fiscal decentralization down to 
public procurement and compensation of public employees. The degree of decentralization of 
public procurement and compensation of employees spending are, respectively, negatively and 
positively associated with good government – and both associations are statistically significant 
as shown in columns 2 (annual data) and 4 (four year means). This is consistent with the 
expectation that spending on public procurement may be vulnerable to misallocation in more 
                                                          
2 See the supplementary appendix for the data sources and definitions as well as the summary statistics 
and the countries included in the sample (Tables SA.1, SA.2 and SA.3 respectively). 
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decentralized settings while the decentralization of public services (proxied here by public sector 
wages) may improve delivery because of informational advantages. Insofar as the control 
variables are concerned the results indicate a robust negative association between good 
governance and the size of the economy and a positive association between the former and GDP 
per capita, EU membership and Protestantism3.  
In table 1 we also pursue the question of whether the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and governance differs before and after 2007. As previously explained, the 
degree of fiscal decentralization generally increases somewhat after 2007. Given our theoretical 
discussion, this should translate to a stronger negative association between decentralized public 
procurement spending and governance after 2007 and a stronger positive association between 
decentralized public employee compensation and governance after this year. And indeed, this 
is what we observe in columns 5 to 8 of table 1 where we split the sample into two sub-periods: 
1996-2007 and 2007-2014. While the association between governance and aggregate fiscal 
decentralization is positive and statistically significant in both periods (columns 5 and 7), the 
impact of the two components of fiscal decentralization changes. Decentralized public 
procurement is not statistically associated with governance in the period 1996-2007, while both 
the size and statistical significance of this (negative) association emerges during the period 2007-
2014. With regards decentralized compensation of employees, the association is positive and 
statistically significant during the first half of the period and strength of this association increases 
in the second half of the period. These results are consistent with the expectation that 
decentralizing public procurement may be inimical to good government while decentralizing 
public service provision will tend to improve governance.  
 
                                                          
3 Our measure of Protestantism comes from North et al. (2013) and reflects the percentage of population 
affiliated with this religion in 1900. The reason for using historical rather than more contemporary values 
is because religious affiliation has tended to fall over time, but the values represented by Protestantism 
may persist. Thus, using contemporary values of affiliation may underestimate the continuing impact of 
these values on governance and public spending.  





In table 2 we consider the robustness of these findings to the introduction of additional control 
variables. Specifically, we account for inter-personal income inequality, the degree of openness 
of the country’s economy and whether a country was previously a member of the Soviet Union. 
Inter-personal inequalities may undermine good government because they may legitimate 
corruption in the eyes of relatively poorer individuals (You and Khagram, 2005) or lead to the 
capture of the state by the wealthy (Glaeser et al., 2003). Inequality may also affect the size and 
composition of public spending (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Milanovic 2000; Acemoglu et al., 
2015). Economic openness – like interjurisdictional competition – may discipline government 
thus improving their performance (Wei, 2000) while it may also affect both the size and 
composition of government expenditure (Shelton 2007). And prior membership of the Soviet 
Union may continue to exercise an influence on governance and public spending insofar as it 
captures a continuing preference for strong government intervention or, it translates into a 
preference for a minimal state as a reaction against Soviet central planning. None of these 
variables have a significant and robust effect on governance although we do find some support 
that openness of a country’s economy may improve government quality. More importantly, the 
inclusion of these variables does not alter our findings. Aggregate fiscal decentralization and the 
14 International Center for Public Policy 
 
decentralization of public employee compensation are positively associated to government 
quality while the decentralization of public procurement has a negative relationship. In table A1 
of the appendix we pursue the robustness of our basic findings further by employing alternative 
measures of governance. In the first half of the table we use the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) published by the Political Risk Services Group that provides information of several 
governance dimensions. We take the average of three dimensions namely: an assessment of 
corruption in the public sector; an assessment of the prevalence of law and order; and the 
perceived quality of the bureaucracy (Howell, undated). In the second half of the table, we check 
whether our results depend on the aggregation method used to generate the base governance 
measure we employ. Specifically, we use instead the first principle component of the four 
governance dimensions that make up the WGI. The first principle component explains 93 per 
cent of the variance of the four governance sub-components. Our findings are robust to the use 
of these alternative governance measures. 
The findings so far speak of association or correlation and not causation. To talk of the latter, 
some effort needs to be made to deal with the possibility of reverse causality or, the possibility 
that government quality may affect the degree of decentralization; both overall fiscal 
decentralization and the decentralization of different components of public expenditure. Bad 
governments could resist the decentralization of fiscal resources, especially those that are easier 
to appropriate for private gain. Consistent with this, Kyriacou et al. (2017) report robust 
empirical evidence indicating that countries with better quality government tend to be more 
fiscally decentralized. In table A2 of the appendix we strive to deal with reverse causality by way 
of instrumental variables and two-stage least-squares regression employing lags of several 
periods of the key endogenous variables. Our results are maintained allowing us to suggest that 
the decentralization of public employee compensation tends to improve governance over the 
whole period and in both sub-sample periods while the decentralization of public procurement 
harms governance over the whole period and, especially, after the year 2007.  
 






Our description of the data in section 2 indicates the usefulness of considering the estimated 
relationships by way of alternative measures that reflect the relative volume of the resources 
spent by sub-central governments. With this aim in mind, table 3 reports regressions including 
sub-national expenditure on public procurement and compensation of public employees, both 
as a percentage of GDP, and after controlling for aggregate fiscal decentralization. The results 
provide support for the argument that the greater the expenditure by sub-central governments 
on public procurement, the worse the quality of governance. This result stands for the whole 
sample period when using both annual data and four year means (columns 1 and 4) as well as 
when, moreover, additional controls are included (columns 5 and 8). Interestingly, the negative 
economic impact of decentralized public procurement increases after 2007, something that is 
consistent with the increase in the relative volume of resources dedicated to this type of 
spending by sub-central government after this year. On the other hand, the results in table 3 do 
not indicate that the relative size of spending of public employee compensation by sub-central 
governments impacts on government quality. One reason why this may be the case is that sub-
central spending on public sector wages as a percentage of GDP speaks more to the volume of 
resources and does not capture the relative information advantage of sub-central government 
(versus central government). A better approximation of the latter is, arguably, spending in this 
area by sub-central governments as a percentage of total spending on public sector wages 
(tables 1 and 2). Alternatively, the use of sub-central spending as percentage of GDP is more 
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informative when considering public procurement because it captures the volume of resources 
that may be available for capture by special interests.  
Conclusion 
In this article, we extend previous work analyzing the impact of fiscal decentralization on 
government performance by breaking fiscal decentralization down to two components namely, 
spending by sub-central governments on public procurement as a share of total spending in this 
area and sub-central spending on public employee compensation again as share of total 
spending on compensation. We adopt this approach because of the theoretical expectation that 
these two expenditure components may relate to government quality differently. Specifically, 
we expect the decentralization of public procurement spending to have a negative impact on 
governance because it combines government discretion with voluminous and concentrated 
rents thus making it vulnerable to rent-seeking by special interests which, by definition, are 
closer to sub-central public officials. Alternatively, we expect the decentralization of public 
employee compensation to have a positive effect on governance since this spending is less 
discretionary and concentrated, but also because it will tend to overlap with the sub-central 
provision of public services which, classic fiscal federalism suggests, should be better provided 
at sub-central levels because of relative informational advantages.  
Our empirical results are overwhelmingly supportive of these theoretical priors. We find, sub-
central spending on public procurement and public sector wages to have, respectively, a 
negative and positive impact on government quality. Our results are robust to the use of 
alternative measures of governance, the introduction of a range of control variables and 
estimation techniques that attempt to deal with the problem of reverse causality. Our findings, 
with regards to the effect of decentralizing public employee compensation, are consistent with 
work reporting a positive effect on allocative and productive efficiency due to the 
decentralization of public service provision – especially the decentralization of education and 
health policies (see OECD, 2014 and Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2017 for recent reviews of these 
results). 
We make another contribution with this article. We consider the extent to which (if at all), the 
Great Recession has altered the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government 
quality. We find that, broadly speaking, fiscal decentralization has increased after 2007 in our 
sample of 31 European countries. In line with the theoretical arguments, this creates the 
expectation of an increase of both the negative and positive effects of decentralization since 
relatively more resources spent by sub-central governments on public procurement increase the 
rents available to special interest and more spending on public sector wages implies more 
decentralized provision of public services. Consistent with this, we find that both the negative 
impact of public procurement on governance and the positive impact of decentralized public 
compensation are larger after 2007.  
Our analysis, based on a sample of 31 European countries over the last two decades, draws 
attention to the diverse effects of decentralizing different components of public spending on 
government quality and suggests the need to adopt strict control measures when decentralizing 
public procurement expenditure at the same time as it highlights the beneficial effects of 
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Figure A1.-Sub-central Public Procurement Expenditure as a % of Total Expenditure in Public 
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Figure A2.- Sub-central Expenditure on Compensation of Employees as a % of Total 
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Figure A4. Sub-central Expenditure on Compensation of Employees as a % of GDP (means 
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Appendix SA.1: Data sources and definitions  
Variable Definition Source 
Government quality 
- WGI 
Aggregate of control of corruption, rule of law, regulatory 
quality and government effectiveness dimensions, normalized 
between minimum possible value of -1 and maximum possible 
value of +1.  
World Governance Indicators 




Aggregate of corruption, law and order and bureaucratic 
quality dimensions each normalized between 0 and 1 and 
summed up. We use data over the period 1995-2013. 
International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) as developed by the 









The sum of the components of general government expenditure 
Intermediate consumption (P.2), gross fixed capital formation 
(P.51g) and social transfers in kind purchased market 




The wages of government employees plus non-wage costs such 
as social contributions (D.1) as a share of GDP. 
Eurostat 
Other expenditure Variable obtained subtracting public procurement 
expenditure and compensation of employees from general 
government expenditure, as a share of GDP. 
Eurostat 
FD on public 
procurement 
State and local expenditure on public procurement divided by 





State and local expenditure on compensation of employees 
divided by general government expenditure on compensation 
of employees. 
Eurostat 
FD on other 
expenditure 
State and local other expenditure divided by general 
government other expenditure. 
Eurostat 
Size of government Expenditure of general government as a share of GDP. Eurostat 
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita. The variable is used in logs. Eurostat 
GDP GDP in real terms. The variable is used in logs. Eurostat 
Protestants Protestants as a percentage of population in 1900. North et al. (2013) 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
The probability that two randomly selected individuals belong 
to different ethnolinguistic or religious groups, and so 
increases with the number of groups.  
Alesina et al, (2003) 
Political 
decentralization 
The degree of political autonomy enjoyed by local 
governments: election of mayor and local council members 
and direct democracy provisions for major tax, spending and 
regulatory decision and the recall of public officials. 
Ivanyna and Shah (2014). 
Trade openness Percentage of exports plus imports divided by Real GDP. Eurostat 
Transition 
economies 
Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the country has 
undergone transition from a socialist to a capitalist system. 
La Porta et al (1999) 
Inequality Gini coefficient based on net income inequality.  Solt (2016) 
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Government quality- WGI 0.472 0.881 -0.166 0.256 620 
Government quality – ICRG 2.356 3.000 1.167 0.477 569 
Fiscal decentralization (FD)  0.274 0.653 0.000 0.150 651 
Public procurement expenditure 0.125 0.217 0.055 0.252  642 
Compensation of employees 0.110 0.175 0.054 0.221  642 
Other expenditure 0.198 0.406 0.066 0.057  636 
FD on public procurement 0.394 0.837 0.035 0.180  641 
FD on compensation of employees 0.444 0.853 0.007 0.234  642 
FD on other expenditure 0.113 0.592 0.000 0.131  630 
Size of government 0.433 0.639 0.274 0.071  639 
GDP per capita  25236 83700  2800 16952  637 
GDP 411781 2791109 5392 627353  645 
Protestants 0.299 0.995 0.001 0.383   31 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.232 0.587 0.041 0.171   31 
Political decentralization 0.659 1.000 0.420 0.123   31 
Income Inequality 0.288 0.375 0.198 0.040  583 
Openness 0.101 0.405 0.247 0.564  639 
WGI refers to the World Governance Indicators and ICRG to the International Country Risk Guide.  
 
 
























BEL GBR NLD Netherlands 
BGR GRC NOR Norway 
CHE HRV POL Poland 
CYP HUN PRT Portugal 
CZE IRL ROM Romania 
DEU ISL SVK Slovakia 
DNK ITA SVN Slovenia 











Table A1. Fiscal Decentralization and Government Quality. Using 
WGI and ICRG (First principle component) 

















FD Public Procurement -1.662* 
  (0.872) 
-1.363 
  (0.918) 
-2.184** 
  (0.939) 
-1.566* 
  (0.947) 
-0.425* 
  (0.243) 
-0.287 
  (0.243) 
-0.750*** 
  (0.271) 
-0.479* 
  (0.259) 
FD Compensation of 
Employees 
2.079** 
  (0,835) 
2.162** 
  (0,849) 
2.698*** 
  (0,983) 
2.203** 
  (0,939) 
0.538** 
  (0,234) 
0.462** 
  (0,230) 
0.988*** 
  (0,286) 
0.629** 
  (0,256) 
Log of GDP -0.188* 
  (0.098) 
-0.200* 
  (0.101) 
-0.173* 
  (0.101) 
-0.198* 
  (0.107) 
-0.060** 
  (0.027) 
-0.071*** 
  (0.027) 
-0.054* 
  (0.029) 
-0.059** 
  (0.029) 
Log of GDP per capita 1.918*** 
  (0,162) 
1.803*** 
  (0,167) 
2.208*** 
  (0,187) 
1.954*** 
  (0,175) 
0.477*** 
  (0,044) 
0.425*** 
  (0,044) 
0.605*** 
  (0,053) 
0.498*** 
  (0,047) 
Public Procurement -0.012 
  (0.040) 
0.001 
  (0.045) 
-0.065 
  (0.045) 
-0.028 
  (0.048) 
0.010 
  (0.012) 
0.010 
  (0.013) 
-0.003 
  (0.014) 
0.008 




  (0,055) 
0.009 
  (0,058) 
0.005 
  (0,057) 
-0.015 
  (0,064) 
-0.001 
  (0,015) 
-0.010 
  (0,016) 
0.020 
  (0,016) 
0.001 
  (0,016) 

































































  (0,373) 
0.794** 
  (0,388) 
1.260*** 
  (0,392) 
0.951** 
  (0,402) 
0.129 
  (0,103) 
0.188* 
  (0,103) 
0.052 
  (0,111) 
0.119 
  (0,108) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -1.362* 
  (0.768) 
-1.507* 
  (0.797) 
-1.208 
  (0.795) 
-1.448* 
  (0.839) 
-0.544** 
  (0.213) 
-0.556*** 
  (0.213) 
-0.554** 
  (0.229) 
-0.551** 
  (0.225) 
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.84 0.83 0.91 0.85 
Observations 602 354 248 151 548 362 186 151 
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. *, **, *** measures statistical significance at the 10, 5 
and 1% levels respectively. ICRG refers to the International Country Risk Guide. All regressions 
report OLS using Period SUR weights and include a constant (not shown). 
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